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Abstract. Smart Meters belong to the Advanced Metering Infrastruc-
ture (AMI) and allow customers to monitor locally and remotely the
current usage of energy. Providers query Smart Meters for billing pur-
pose or to establish the amount of energy needed by houses. However,
reading details sent from smart meters to the energy provider can be
used to violate customers’ privacy. In this paper, our contribution is two-
fold: first, we present an architecture to turn traditional energy meters
into Smart Meters, and then we illustrate a privacy-preserving solution,
which uses Secure Two-party Computation, to preserve customers’ pri-
vacy during energy-readings. In particular, we deployed a Smart Meter
built upon an existing energy meter available in Italy. Then, we collected
and analysed an energy trace of two months, and we tag customers
hourly/daily/monthly habits by observing their consumes. Finally, we
provide the feasibility of our solution to protect customers’ privacy.
Keywords: Smart meter · Privacy · Secure Two-party computation ·
Energy trace · Raspberry pi
1 Introduction
The current energy infrastructure provides electric meters that run basic opera-
tions, e.g. showing the energy used in an embedded display. Over last ten years,
Italy has maintained the electric meter leadership with ENEL and its “Telege-
store”, which is able to communicate with the energy provider through narrow-
band Power Line Communication (PLC).
The interest in developing and deploying new meters, called Smart Meters,
is one of the next years goals. In 2007, the US Congress decided to modernise
its electricity transmission distribution network via the Energy Independence
and Security. In 2009, the European Union passed a directive asking all Member
States to conduct an economic assessment of smart metering1. In Energy: Com-
mission paves the way for massive roll-out of smart metering systems2 published
in 2012, the European Commission asserts that only 10% of houses have some
1 European Parliament and Council, ’Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC
2 http://tiny.cc/sfyzvx
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sort of smart meter installed, and that 80% of all electricity meters in the EU
will be replaced by smart meters by 2020. As negative fact, in November 2014,
the UK’s Department of Energy and Climate Change announced that the UK’s
smart metering deployment is delayed for other twelve months3 without giving
a clear reason for that choice.
From the above situations, the installation of Smart Meters into every house
appears to be a long process. Thus, in this paper we propose an architecture
to turn current energy meters into Smart Meters to bridge the gap between
the Smart Meters roll-out and the existing energy meters. In particular, we
developed a meter in which customers are able to know in real time their energy
consumption both locally and remotely by using any device connected to the
Internet, plus the opportunity to record the energy consumptions for analytics.
Then, we show a privacy study of our energy trace4 that illustrates how to
identify some human behaviours analysing the energy consumption. In fact, the
adoption of “smart” devices brings new privacy issues that attackers may exploit
for different purposes. For instance, attackers could observe the energy consumes
of a house to learn the daily activities of the landlord in order to discover the
right period to burgle his house.
Not only privacy issues hit Smart Meter, but also security problems can
create damages to Smart Meters and their owners. As an example, Spanish
researchers5 proved how to send to the energy provider fake values of energy
reads to get a “lighter” bill. In this attack, the researchers were able to discover
the keys adopted by the smart meters and the provider nodes to spoof exchanged
messages.
Finally, we propose the use of Secure-Two-party Computation (STC) to pre-
serve customers’ privacy. STC is part of the cryptographic field, and it can be
used for privacy-preserving computation in which the goal of the two parties is to
jointly compute the outcome of a generic function g(x, y) without disclosing to
the other party the own input. Our solution allows customers to keep protected
their values of energy, but at the same time providers have indication on how
much energy customers need.
The structure of this paper is the following: in Section 2 we provide our archi-
tecture to turn traditional energy meters into Smart Meters. In Section 3, we
plot energy consumes and we illustrate how it is possible to rebuild customer
hourly/daily/monthly pattern by observing his energy consumption. In Section 4,
we provide our solution to preserve customers’ privacy using STC. Section 5 shows
some work related to ours. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Smart Meter Architecture
In this section we show the architecture that we use to turn an energy meter into
a smart one. Figure 1 shows the building blocks of our architecture. We use the
3 http://tiny.cc/7gyzvx
4 We recorded two months of energy consumption with our Smart Meter.
5 http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29643276
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Fig. 1. Smart Meter Architecture
Envir Current Cost6 to estimate the energy required by all capabilities attached
at the house energy net, and the Raspberry Pi, which is programmed to store all
energy consumes and to expose a web service able to communicate the current
energy usage to remote entities connected to the Internet, such as Smartphones,
Tablets and so on.
The Envir device is composed by two main components: the transmitter and
the receiver. The transmitter is attached to the energy meter through a sensor
jaw, instead the receiver is located into the house and displays the current energy
usage plus other details, such as the indoor temperature, time and so on.
The Raspberry Pi is a tiny and low cost computer with 700 Mhz ARM proces-
sor, 512 Mbyte of RAM that runs a Unix Operating System. In our architecture
the Raspberry Pi hosts a MySQL database plus an Apache TomCat WebServer,
and the Raspberry Pi is connected to the Internet with an additional WiFi
interface.
Figure 1 summarises our architecture. On the left side, the sensor jaw is
hooked up the fuse cable of the energy meter of the building. The Envir receiver
is located inside the building and shows the current energy use. The displayed
values are updated every six seconds, and an outgoing serial cable connects the
receiver to the Raspberry Pi.
2.1 Recording Energy Consumes
The data stream sent from the Envir device to the Raspberry Pi is evaluated
using a Python script, see code listed in 1.1. The port variable expresses the
mounting point of the serial port into the Raspberry Pi operating system, the
baud rate specifies the number of symbols sent per second, while the timeout
specifies the number of seconds to wait until the program stops with a connection
6 Available here: http://www.currentcost.com/product-envir.html
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error. We use the object “Serial” to read the stream from the cable, while the
meter variable is a string containing all data read from the serial cable.
port = ’/dev/ttyUSB0 ’
baud = 57600
timeout = 10
...
meter = serial.Serial(port , baud , timeout=timeout)
Listing 1.1. Python code to read from the serial port
From the data stream, we extrapolate two main values: i) last monitored
energy consume, and ii) the current indoor temperature. These two values are
saved into local variables and, then stored into a MySQL table. In the same
SQL-insert tuple, we introduce two more variables, indicating time and date. For
performance reasons, we decide to store data into the database roughly each
minute although the data stream is read every six seconds.
2.2 Remote Reading
To make more powerful our Smart Meter, we installed a web-server into the
Raspberry Pi. It aims at exposing one or more web services that can be remotely
called to provide real time information. Web-services are called through a unique
web address and the output is given as a “html” page.
The web-server we adopted is Apache Tomcat7, and web-services imple-
mentation usually follows two approaches: SOAP8 and REST 9. The first one
exposes a set of methods that can be invoked remotely by clients, while REST
allows developers to define a set of resources that clients can request using the
HTTP/HTTPs protocol.
In our implementation we prefer the REST technology since it is lightweight
and fast, which are essential features for developing technologies on Smart
Meters. For our purpose, we expose a single web-service in which users can visu-
alise through a web browser last monitored energy consumption and internal
temperature.
Figure 2 completes the architecture of our smart meter connected to the
Internet. The traditional energy meter is linked to the home area network by
means of the Envir device and the Raspberry Pi. This latter exploits the Internet
connection to expose the web-server. At the same time, the web-service allows
any authorised user to reach the Smart Meter information using her own device.
Access control is managed using username and password authentication for users
who want to access the web-service.
2.3 Pros and Cons
We acknowledge this architecture has some limitations. For instance, we admit
that a customer has only the power to “read” data from his/her meter and not
7 http://tomcat.apache.org
8 http://www.w3.org/TR/soap/
9 http://tiny.cc/esswhx
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Fig. 2. Our Smart Meter connected to the Internet
to “write”. In fact, a customer is not able to change any kind of data saved in
the meter. However, this sort of limitation can be seen also as positive feature
since a potential customer/attacker has not ability to corrupt smart meter data.
A strength of our architecture is its versatility. It is enough to plug the sensor
jaw to the fuse cable of the meter to know the energy used, then the Raspberry
Pi completes the architecture to turn a meter into a smart one. In this way,
customers are able to manage their consumes, and can forecast the billing price
as well as compare the energy used declared in the bill with that one estimated
by the smart meter.
3 Privacy Study
The architecture introduced in the previous section found its application in a
flat located in Italy. Currently, ENEL’s customers have installed at home the
Telegestore10 meter. Advantage of the “Telegestore” is to be already connected
with the Enel servers, through narrow-band Power Line Communication (PLC).
This kind of communication avoids that Enel-employees pass house-by-house to
collect the consume of energy of each meter. Nevertheless, customers at home
do not have direct control of the meter as well as remote reading of the current
energy consume. In fact, they can read the energy consumption through a display
embedded into the meter. Generically, meters are located outside the building
and in some cases they are not easily accessible.
For our experiments, we started collecting energy consumes at the end of
April 2014, and we had collected data for two months, up to the end of June.
In Figure 3 we plot the consumes recorder in a single hour. Values collected
are 54 since the measurements are saved into the database roughly every minute.
Observing all consumes it is possible to extrapolate a particular detail. We found
10 http://www.enel.com/en-GB/innovation/smart grids/smart metering/telegestore/
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Fig. 3. One hour flat consumes
Fig. 4. 24 hours flat consumes
an energy peak every 30 minutes related to an appliance that we link to the
fridge. In fact, it remains “on” for about seven minutes and then switches to
“off”. After half an hour it goes “on” again.
In Figure 4, we plot the energy consumes per hour in a single day. Values
reported for each hour are obtained averaging all consumes. Results of this figure
are very interesting since we identify different periods of the day. Starting from
midnight, in which it is recorded a high consume of energy, then we observe a
low consume of energy during the nighttime. Afterwards, around “09:00” in the
morning a new peak of energy identifies the moment in which there was activity
in the flat. During the daytime the consume of energy is low and pretty uniform
saying that nobody was in the flat except an usage activity monitored around
“18:00”. Finally, after “20:00” new peaks of energy are registered representing
again more request of energy.
In Figure 5 we show the energy consumes monitored during May 2014. Con-
sumes of each days are plotted as the mean of the entire day consumes. Dur-
ing this month we identify three different intervals in which consumes are low.
Those periods correspond to a holiday time, from first to fourth of May, and
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Fig. 5. Flat consumes in May
Fig. 6. Flat consumes in June
two conferences, from twelfth to sixteenth of May and at the end of the same
month. Then, for three days, from fifth to eighth of May, we observe the highest
consume of energy explained by the presence of additional people in the flat.
In the same figure we do not have measurements for two days at the end of
the month since our Smart Meter lost the connection with the database did not
record any energy value.
In Figure 6 we plot the average-consumes per day in June. At first glimpse,
we notice weekly high peaks of energy that correspond to those days in which the
activity at home is higher than other days, e.g. “Sunday”. Then, we tag another
interval of days as “Holiday” in which we notice a low consume of energy that
corresponds to a period in which nobody was at home. An empty space is present
in the data trace during the 20th and 21st of June since we experienced again a
network issue.
Energy Trace. Our values of energy may be useful for the community of
researchers working in this field. For this reason, we share our consume trace
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giving the chance to others researchers to make their sturdies on real energy
consumes.
In the file we share, there are energy consumes of the flat that we used as
test-bed in May-June 2014 period. Each row in the file is composed by three
fields separated by “;” that represent: “Data”, “Time” and “Watt”. Our trace
file can be imported into a database or can be directly analysed using the text
file. It is available here11.
4 Privacy Solution
In this section, we propose a privacy solution apt to protect customers’ real-
time readings done by providers. In particular, our solution makes use of Secure
Two-party Computation to indicate in a range the effective customers’ energy
consumption without revealing the exact smart meter reading to the provider.
4.1 Using STC Inside Smart Meters
We believe that the cryptographic field may help proposing methods that can
reduce the privacy issue seen above. In Secure Two-party Computation two
parties are involved, generically called Alice and Bob, each holding some private
data x and y, respectively. The goal of STC functions computation is to allow
Alice and Bob to jointly compute the outcome of a function f(x, y), without
disclosing to the other party their own input. The straightforward way to solve
the above problem would be to have a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to which
Alice and Bob securely send the data, and to have the TTP compute f(x, y)
and separately send the outcome to Alice and Bob. The business in secure two-
party computation amounts to securely compute f(x, y) without the need of a
TTP.
The first implementation of Secure-Two party Computation was made by Yao
in the 1980s [1], presenting a solution for the well-known “Millionaire Problem”.
In the Millionaire Problem, the two parties want to know whom of them is richer
without revealing to the other party his/her own amount of money. The problem
requires the evaluation of x < y condition, where Alice knows only “x”, and Bob
knows only “y”. At the end of the protocol execution, Alice knows only the
outcome of the evaluation of condition x < y, without knowing y (similarly for
Bob).
Over the last ten years, researchers have proposed different Secure Two-party
Computation frameworks able to run secure functions. FairPlay [13] is a well-
know framework that allows users to write functions using its high level language
(SFDL), and to compile functions into garbled boolean circuits, which will mask
the real inputs of both participants. FairPlay has strong security properties in
the context of two-party computation. The framework is shown to be secure
against a malicious party; in particular i) a malicious party cannot learn more
11 http://tiny.cc/5v41vx
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information about the other party’s input than it can learn from a TTP that
computes the function; and ii) a malicious party cannot change the output of the
computed function. New versions of this framework are FairplayMP [2], which
is the extension of Fairplay that works with more than two parties, and Mobile-
Fairplay [5],[6], which is the version of Fairplay ported to Android Smartphones.
A more recent STC framework is MightBeEvil [11]. It allows people to easily
write functions that can be run in a secure way, in a similar way done by Fairplay,
however, MightBeEvil is faster and less memory-hungry than Fairplay.
The STC framework that we use in our smart meter is CBMC-GC [10]. It
is composed by two main parts: one is the compiler that translates functions
written in C into garbled circuits, while the other part is the interpreter able
to execute compiled functions [12]. Compared with Fairplay, CBMC-GC offers
a more flexible high language that allows developers to express more detailed
and complicated functions. Moreover, thanks to its optimisation steps during
the compilations phase, CBMC-GC runs STC function using less memory than
framework like Fairplay.
STC attacker model. The aforementioned STC frameworks are secure against
the honest-but-curious attacker model. In this model, an attacker follows all pro-
tocol steps as per specifications, but she can try to learn additional information
about the other party, with the purpose of acquiring at least part of her private
profile. Moreover, notice that, as customary in secure two-party computation,
there is an asymmetry on the provided security guarantees: in particular, there
is no way to prevent Alice from terminating the protocol prematurely, and not
sending the outcome of the computation to Bob. This situation can be detected
by Bob, but cannot be recovered from.
4.2 Our Solution
Here, we propose the use of STC to preserve customers’ privacy when providers
remotely read the energy value from the smart meter. We ported the CBMC-
GC framework to our smart meter and we allow both provider and customer
to run STC functions. To preserve customer’s privacy, we wrote a function in
which the customer’s smart meter provides its current usage of energy as input,
and the provider uses three intervals of energy as indication of energy usage. The
output of our function indicates to the provider in which range the smart meter’s
input falls on, but the provider will never know its exact value. For instance, let
suppose that the provider uses the following ranges in Watt (W): [0, 1000]W ,
[1001, 2000]W , [2001, 3000]W , and last meter reading is 547W. After running
the STC function the provider knows that last monitored consume ranges in the
interval [0, 1000]W , but it does not know the exact value, although it had been
used to evaluate the energy consumption.
The listing in 1.2 shows the STC function that we wrote in C. The range
function calculates the exact range of usage and it uses four variables: x is the
reading done by the meter, y, t, and z are respectively the first, second, and third
interval limit. In addition, each range is mapped as single progressive number,
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i.e. [0, 1000]W → 1, [1001, 2000]W → 2, [2001, 3000]W → 3. To obtain a more
fine-grained output, our program may consider more than three intervals.
int range(int x, int y, int z, int t)
{
int output = 0;
if ((x >= 0) && (x <= y))
output = 1;
else if ((x > y) && (x <= z))
output = 2;
else if ((x > z) && (x <= t))
output = 3;
return output;
}
void meterCheck(int INPUT_A_x , int INPUT_B_int1 , int INPUT_B_int2 , int
INPUT_B_int3)
{
int OUTPUT_meterCheck = range(INPUT_A_x , INPUT_B_int1 , INPUT_B_int2 ,
INPUT_B_int3);
}
Listing 1.2. STC function written in C
Implementation. The C-function listed in 1.2 is translated into garbled cir-
cuits by the CBMC-GC compiler, and the garbled circuits are distributed to the
provider’s computer and to customer’s smart meter. The CBMC-GC running
environment is also installed both on the smart meter and the provider’s pc as
it is depicted in Figure 7. In particular, the CBMC-GC instance installed in the
meter waits for incoming queries from the provider, and once the connection is
established they start the secure computation. Only at the end of the computa-
tion the provider is able to know in which range the smart meter reading falls on.
Fig. 7. Customer’s smart meter and provider’s PC with CBMC-GC
Empirical test conducted in our lab showed that using a Virtual Machine
(VM) with Ubuntu OS and 16Gbyte of RAM to represent provider’s PC, and the
Raspberry Pi to represent smart meter, the time needed to run the function with
CBMC-GC framework is about 40 seconds. The high computational time is due
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to the complexity of mathematical operations required by the STC framework
and, particularly by the low computation power of our Raspberry Pi. We believe
that in this context 40 seconds are a feasible time, and to support our belief,
in this document12, Enel claims that its Smart Meter saves every two minutes
the KiloWatt taken. So, in practice Enel would have the time to run the STC
function without losing any data precision.
5 Related Work
Privacy issues related to smart meters’ reading have been studied in papers
[8], [16], [17] and previously acknowledged in [4], [9]. The authors of [3] show
how to apply homomorphic schemes for aggregation in smart metering data
to protect customers’ privacy, and in particular they discuss the applicability
of the method presented by Ma´rmol et al. [14]. A similar data aggregation is
performed by Sankar et al. [19] in which data collected by multiple meters are
aggregated before sending them to the utility. Rial and Danezis in [18] propose
a protocol for privacy-preserving meter readings, and at the same time prove
the reading correctness of the meter. Molina et al. in [15] shows how to apply
Zero-Knowledge Proofs to low-cost microcontrollers to produce certified meter
readings. In [7] the authors propose a solution to preserve customers’ privacy
providing encrypted meter reading with the adoption of secret-sharing-based
secure multi-party computation techniques. Thoma and Cui in [20] make use
of secure multi-party computation to know customers energy demand keeping
hided the amount of energy needed by each consumer.
In the market there exist commercial tools to monitor energy consumption
using indoor display or web-browser. TED pro-home13 is a commercial for resi-
dential electricity monitoring and its price starts from 300$. The Egauge System
company14 sells its powerful product “EG3000” for energy monitoring start-
ing from 500$. Openenergymonitor15 is a project to develop open-source energy
monitoring tools. This project proposes different hardware solutions and sen-
sors that can be built together to create a monitoring system accessible by a
web-application.
None of these contributions is totally related to ours, although we are not
the first that apply cryptographic solutions to protect customers’ privacy. To
the best of our knowledge, our research paper is the only one that integrates an
architecture to turn current meters into smart ones, with a cost of around 100e,
and a mechanism to protect customers’ privacy all in a single feasible solution.
12 There exists only the italian version: https://www.enel.it/it-IT/doc/reti/
enel distribuzione/Contatore Monofase v1.pdf
13 http://www.theenergydetective.com/tedprohome.html
14 https://www.egauge.net
15 http://openenergymonitor.org/emon/
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an architecture to turn traditional energy meters
into new Smart Meters with a solution to preserve customers’ privacy. In partic-
ular, our prototype of Smart Meter allowed us to record energy consumes for two
months in a fine-grained fashion, i.e. roughly each minute. With the collected
energy values, we illustrated how it is possible to identify human patterns, and
for this issue, we implemented a solution that makes use of Secure-Two-party
Computation to preserve customers’ privacy during the real time monitoring.
Finally, we showed the feasibility of our intuition by porting the CBMC-GC
framework inside our smart meter prototype.
As further step, our intention is to use the new Raspberry Pi 2 —quad-
core of 900Mhz and 1GByte of RAM— within our architecture. Benchmark
tests claim that the Pi 2 is 6x faster that the previous model. This means that
our STC computation will get a substantial speed up respect to the current
implementation.
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